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We estimate how offshoring and exporting affect wages by skill type. Our data match the population
of Danish workers to the universe of private-sector Danish firms, whose trade flows are broken down
by product and origin and destination countries. Our data reveal new stylized facts about offshoring
activities at the firm level, and allow us to both condition our identification on within-job-spell changes
and construct instruments for offshoring and exporting that are time varying and uncorrelated with
the wage setting of the firm.  We find that within job spells, (1) offshoring tends to increase the high-skilled
wage and decrease the low-skilled wage; (2) exporting tends to increase the wages of all skill types;
(3) the net wage effect of trade varies substantially across workers of the same skill type; and (4) conditional
on skill, the wage effect of offshoring exhibits additional variation depending on task characteristics.
We then track the outcomes for workers after a job spell and find that those displaced from offshoring
firms suffer greater earnings losses than other displaced workers, and that low-skilled workers suffer
greater and more persistent earnings losses than high-skilled workers.
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the	 firm	 level.	 	 The	 literature	 on	 heterogeneous	 firms	 shows	 tha t 	h i g h 	p r o d u c t i v i t y 	f i r m s 	a r e 	








While	 these	 shocks	 are	 exogenous	 to	 Danish	 firms,	 their	 impact	 varies	 markedly	 across	 firms	
precisely	because	the	firms	have	few	or	no	inputs	in	common.		That	is,	if	only	one	Danish	firm	buys	
titanium	hinges	from	Japan,	shocks	to	the	supply	or	transport	costs	of	those	hinges	affects	just	that	





We	 begin	 by	 examining	 how	 exogenous	 shocks	 to	 trade	 are	 correlated	 with	 firm‐level	
variables.	 	 Offshoring	 and	 exporting	 are	 positively	 correlated	 with	 firm	 sales,	 profits	 and	 the	
average	wage	bill.	Exporting	is	positively	correlated	with	employment,	but	offshoring	is	associated	




elasticity	 of	 +3.1%	 to	 +3.6%	 within	 job	 spells.	 These	 results	 su g g e s t 	t h a t 	o f f s h o r i n g 	t e n d s 	t o 	












effects	 differ	 by	 task	 characteristics,	 conditional	 on	 skill	 typ e . 	W e 	f i n d 	t h a t 	w o r k e r s 	w h o s e 	
occupations	 involve	 routine	 tasks	 (as	 in	 Autor,	 et	 al.	 2003)	 and	 those	 that	 expose	 workers	 to	
                                                 
3 This literature typically examines the effects on the relative high-skilled wage (or relative high-skilled demand). 
We show the effects on the levels of both low-skilled and high-skilled wages.  4 
 
potentially	unsafe	working	conditions	experience	larger	wage	drops	with	offshoring.	In	contrast,	





































within	 a	 skill	 type,	 and	 to	 analyze	 wage	 changes	 within‐job	 spell	 versus	 wage	 changes	 due	 to	











                                                 
4 For example, we do not focus on how globalization affects employment or resource reallocation, the subject of a 
number of recent studies using matched worker-firm data (e.g. Menezes‐Filho	and	Muendler	2011).	 6 
 
II.		Data	Description	












jobs	 during	 unemployment	 are	 reinforced	 through	 monitoring	 and	 sanction.	 Together	 these	
ingredients	form	what	has	been	called	the	'flexicurity'	model.			
The	flexibility	of	the	Danish	labor	market	may	seem	surprising	as	over	three	quarters	of	all	







                                                 

























                                                 
6	The	firm	identifier	is	in	FirmStat	derived	from	the	register	“Old	Firm	Statistics”	for	the	period	1995‐1999	
and	from	“General	Firm	Statistics”	for	the	period	1999‐2006.	These	two	registers	in	combination	allow	us	to	













regardless	 of	 his/her	 employment	 status	 or	 employer	 identity.	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 condition	 our	
identification	on	the	changes	within	a	given	worker‐firm	match	(i.e.	we	control	for	job‐spell	fixed	
effects),	and	to	track	the	effects	of	offshoring	on	the	earnings	of	displaced	workers	over	time.	The	
h i g h 	q u a l i t y 	o f 	t h e 	m a t c h 	r e s u l t s 	f r o m 	t w o 	f e a t u r e s 	o f 	t h e 	d a t a . 	O n e , 	t h e 	I D A 	a n d 	F I D A 	a r e 	
administrative	data	and	the	worker	identifier	used	there	remains	unchanged	throughout	1995‐
2006.		 Two,	the	informal	sector	is	 almost	 non‐existent	in	 Denmark,	unlike	in	some	developing	
c o u n t r i e s 	s u c h 	a s 	B r a z i l 	a n d 	M e x i c o 	t h a t 	h a v e 	b e e n 	p r e v i o u s l y 	u sed	 in	 matched	 worker‐firm	
studies.		
Our	trade	data	comes	from	the	Danish	Foreign	Trade	Statistics	Register.	For	each	firm	in	
each	 year	 1990‐2006	 we	 have	 import s 	d i s a g g r e g a t e d 	b y 	o r i g i n 	a n d 	p r o d u c t 	a n d 	e x p o r t s 	
disaggregated	 by	 destination	 and	 p r o d u c t . 	T h e 	T r a d e 	S t a t i s t i c s 	Register	 uses	 the	 same	 firm	
identifier	as	FirmStat	and	FIDA,	allowing	us	to	match	product‐level	trade	data	with	our	worker‐firm	
data	 on	 an	 annual	 basis.	 Trade	 flows	 are	 recorded	 according	 to	 the	 eight‐digit	 Combined	
Nomenclature,	 but	 we	 aggregate	 these	 flows	 to	 the	 roughly	 5000	 products	 in	 the	 six‐digit	




e x t r a ‐ E U 	t r a d e 	f l o w s 	a r e 	r e c o r d e d 	b y 	c u s t o m s 	a u t h o r i t i e s . 	I n t r a stat	 does	 not	 have	 complete	
coverage	because	firms	are	only	obliged	to	report	intra‐EU	trade	if	the	annual	trade	value	exceeds	a	
                                                                                                                                                             







cannot	 investigate	 the	 changes	 in	 wage	 or	 employment	 status	 at	 weekly,	 monthly	 or	 quarterly	


















                                                 























i n p u t s 	b y 	D a n i s h 	f i r m s , 	r a t h e r 	t h a n 	i m p o r t s 	p u r c h a s e d 	f o r 	d i r e c t	 consumption	 by	 Danish	














of	 manufacturing	 firms’	 imports14,	 or	 manufactured	 inputs	 that	 the	 firm	 would	 be	 unlikely	 to	
















foreign	 technology	 embodied	 in	 machinery	 imports	 may	 affect	 labor	 demand	 and	 wages	 (e.g.	
Hanson	and	Harrison	1999)	but	through	a	different	channel	than	offshoring	of	material	inputs	that	
could	have	been	produced	by	the	firm.	While	we	do	not	take	a	strong	stand	that	we	can	completely	
                                                 
14	We	define	raw	materials	as	imports	in	HS	categories	01‐15,	25‐27,	31	and	41.  12 
 
s e p a r a t e 	t h e 	e f f e c t s 	o f 	o f f s h o r i n g 	m a t e r i a l 	i n p u t s 	v e r s u s 	t e c h n ological	 change	 embodied	 in	
machinery	 imports,	 we	 do	 want	 to	d i s t i n g u i s h 	w h e r e 	s u c h 	e f f e c t s 	a r e 	l i k e l y 	t o 	a p p e a r 	i n 	o u r 	
analysis.	
The	 HS	 system	 classifies	 most	 types	 of	 machinery	 in	 HS84,	 “Nuclear	 reactors,	 boilers,	


































similarly	 for	 broad	 and	 narrow	 offshoring.	 Table	 1	 shows	 that	 offshoring	 and	 exports	 vary	









































,  where  , and  jt jt jt jt jt jt jt jt YA K H C C LM




   .	 			15 
 
In	equation	(1),	 jt Y 	is	output,	 jt A 	is	productivity,	 jt K 	is	capital	and	 jt H 	is	skilled	labor.	 jt C 	is	a	CES	
composite	input	using	unskilled	labor,	 jt L 	and	imported	inputs,	 jt M 	and	σ	>	0	is	the	substitution	
elasticity	for	unskilled	labor	and	imported	inputs.16	Imported	inputs	correspond	to	offshoring	in	
our	data.			
Let	 jt  	be	a	reduced‐form	representation	for	the	demand	for	firm	j’s	output	(e.g.	if	the	

















unskilled	labor	demand	if	 1/ ( ) 0    .	The	intuition	is	that	the	increase	in	 jt M 	has	two	
effects:	it	increases	the	composite	input,	 jt C ,	at	the	rate	1/ ,	but	diminishing	returns	to	 jt C 	set	in	
at	the	rate	 ()   .	When	unskilled	labor	and	imported	inputs	are	very	close	substitutes	so	that	
1/ 0   ,	diminishing	returns	dominate	and	unskilled	labor	demand	decreases.	When	labor	and	





	 Equation	 (2)	 illustrates	 an	 important	 endogeneity	 issue	 in	 estimating	 the	 effect	 of	
                                                 
16	We	have	skilled	and	unskilled	labor	entering	asymmetrically	to	illustrate	the	difference	between	labor	
types	that	are	substitutes	for	or	complements	to	imported	inputs.		We	explore	generalizations	in	the	theory	




exogenous	rise	in	firm	j’s	exports	as	a	positive	demand	shift	for	firm	j’s	output.  16 
 
offshoring	on	labor	demand.	Suppose	1/ ( )     	so	that	for	a	given	level	of	output	a	rise	in	
offshoring	reduces	demand	for	unskilled	labor.	An	increase	in	either	firm	productivity	 jt A 	or	output	




and	by	using	instrumented	shocks	to	exports	to	capture	movements	in	 jt  .		
	 A 	r e l a t e d 	p r o b l e m 	e m p h a s i z e d 	i n 	t h e 	t r a d e 	l i t e r a t u r e 	i s 	t h a t 	o ffshoring	 may	 have	 a	







allowing	 output	 and	 capital	 to	 change	 in	 response	 to	 offshoring	 to	 capture	 the	 additional	
productivity	effect.18	
	 Our	empirical	work	focuses	on	wages.	We	assume	that	the	firm	faces	an	unskilled	labor	
supply	curve	with	elasticity	 Ls  	and	similarly	for	skilled	labor,	 Hs  .	If	labor	supply	is	perfectly	
elastic,	 Ls  ,	then	shocks	to	labor	demand	will	result	in	employment	changes	but	not	wage	
r e s p o n s e s . 	I f 	l a b o r 	s u p p l y 	c u r v e s 	s l o p e 	u p w a r d , 19	 then	 the	 wage	 response	 to	 an	 offshoring	 or	
                                                 
18	We	are	grateful	to	Gene	Grossman	for	pointing	out	this	distinction.	
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where 0 (0,1) c  	 is	 a	 constant	 and	 , 0 LD   	 is	 the	 elasticity	 of	 labor	 demand.	 , 0 LM b  	i f 	





framework	used	above	to	our	data,	we	assume	that	each	unskilled	worker	i		has	productivity	 ijt h 	in	
y e a r 	t 	a n d 	 1 exp( ) ijt it ij hx    ,	 where	 it x 	 represents	 observable	 worker	 characteristics	 (e.g.	
experience),	 1  	is	a	vector	of	coefficients,	and	 ij  	represents	unobservable	ability	that	is	specific	to	
the	worker‐firm	match.		Unskilled	workers	are	the	same	up	to	the	productivity	term,	so	that	worker	
i	receives	wage	 ,, Li j t Li t i j t ww h  .	Similar	expressions	govern	high	skill	labor	wages.	Using	equation	
(2)	and	assuming	finite	labor	supply	elasticities	we	have	
(3)	
,1, 1 ln ln ln ln ln
            +  ln .
ijt L M jt M i jt L X jt X it jt
it K jt h jt jt ij ijt
wb Mb S Mb b S






In	 equation	 (3),	 i S 	 is	 a	 dummy	 variable	 that	 equals	 1	 if	 worker	 i	 is	 high‐skilled.		 , LM b 	i s 	t h e 	
elasticity	of	unskilled	wage	with	respect	to	offshoring,	and	 ,,1 H ML MM bb b   	is	the	elasticity	of	




region	fixed	effects	( , ,  and  tI N D R   )	and	a	price	index	that	is	specific	to	j’s	industry,	 , IND t P ,	to	
control	for	those	respective	components	of	 jt A 	and	 jt  .	We	use	job‐spell	fixed	effects	to	absorb ij  ,	
the	unobserved	ability	specific	to	the	worker‐firm	match	(Abowd	et	al.	1999).	The	job	spell	fixed	
effects	also	absorb	the	components	of	 jt A 	and	 jt  	that	are	worker‐firm	specific.	Time	varying	
shocks	to	worker	productivity	are	captured	by	including	a	vector	 it x of	worker‐level	characteristics,	
such	as	experience,	union	status	and	marital	status,	that	change	over	time.	To	capture	time	varying	
shocks	to	 jt  we	use jt X ,	the	value	of	firm	j’s	exports	in	year	t.	Firms	may	have	time	varying	shocks	
to	productivity	that	are	correlated	with	both	offshoring	and	exporting	activities	and	with	worker	
wages.		Accordingly,	we	will	instrument	for	both	offshoring	and	exporting	as	discussed	in	the	next	
sub‐section.	Finally,	we	include	a	vector	 it z 	of	firm‐control	variables	(output,	employment,	capital,	
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and	 wage	 structure.	 The	 offshoring	 instruments	 are	 world	 export	s u p p l y , 	e x c h a n g e 	r a t e s , 	a n d 	
transport	costs.	The	exports	instruments	are	world	import	demand,	exchange	rates	and	transport	
costs.21				




                                                 







22 Using a similar strategy, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2011) instrument U.S. imports from China by Chinese exports 
to other high-income, non-U.S. countries.   20 
 
world	import	demand	 ckt WID 	is	country	c’s	total	purchases	of	product	k	from	the	world	market	
(less	purchases	from	Denmark)	at	time	t.		A	rise	in	WID	could	result	from	shocks	to	demand	(either	
consumer	 tastes	 or	 industrial	 uses	 of	 particular	 products)	 or	 reflect	 a	 loss	 of	 comparative	
advantage	by	c	in	product	k.	
The	exchange	rate	and	transport	costs	capture	shocks	to	the	delivered	price	of	particular	
inputs	purchased	by	Denmark.	The	exchange	rate	 ct E is	the	annual	average	rate,	denoted	in	foreign	
currency	 c	p e r 	D K K 	s o 	t h a t 	a n 	i n c r e a s e 	i n 	 ct E i s 	a n 	a p p r e c i a t i o n 	o f 	t h e 	D K K . 	S i n c e 	w e 	a r e 	
aggregating	over	source	countries,	we	normalize	 ct E 	by	its	over‐time	mean	value	to	remove	unit	
differences.			
To	get	transportation	costs	we	first	estimate	cost	functions	using	US	imports	data	following	
Hummels	 (2007).	 We	 then	 use	 the	 estimated	 coefficients	 plus	 pre‐sample	 information	 on	 the	









have	 country‐product‐time	 variation.	 To	 get	 a	 single	 value	 for	 each	 firm‐year	 we	 aggregate	 as	
follows.	Let	 ckt I 	represent	instrument	 (,, ) I tc E WES  	for	exporting	country	c,	selling	HS	6	product	21 
 
k,	at	time	t,	and	let	 jck s 	represent	the	share	of	c‐k	in	total	materials	imports	for	firm	j		in	the	pre‐
sample	year		(1994).23	Then	to	construct	a	time	varying	instrument	for	firm	j	we	have		
,










sample	 also	 appeared	 in	 the	 pre‐sample	 (conversely,	 roughly	 one‐third	 of	 in‐sample	 import	
purchases	were	not	represented	in	the	pre‐sample).		
	
Over	 time	 there	 are	 shocks	 to	 the	 desirability	 of	 purchasing	 input	 k	 from	 country	 c.		
Transportation	 costs	 and	 exchange	 rates	 may	 become	 more	 favourable,	 or	 country	 c	m a y 	
experience	changes	in	its	production	costs,	production	variety	or	quality	that	are	exogenous	to	firm	




The	 use	 of	 pre‐sample	 shares,	 jck s , 	i m p l i e s 	t h a t 	o u r 	s a m p l e 	c o n s i s t s 	o f 	f i r m ‐ y e a r 	
observations	with	positive	import	and	export	values.	We	handle	entry	into	offshoring	by	using	the	
entry	 year	 as	 the	 pre‐sample	 and	 exploiting	 subsequent	 variation	 in	 offshoring.	 	 That	 is,	 our	
estimates	do	not	reflect	wage	changes	resulting	from	a	discrete	change	from	no	offshoring	to	the	














We	 first	 consider	 possible	 problems	 with	 the	 instruments	 ckt I themselves,	 and	 then	 consider	
possible	problems	with	the	firm	share	weighting	 jck s .			
Shocks	to	exchange	rates	or	transport	costs	may	affect	both	the	cost	of	inputs	and	the	ability	
to	export	from	Denmark.	If	we	only	included	instrumented	offshoring	in	equations	(4)	and	(5),	this	














varying	 demand	 shocks	 outside	 of	 Denmark.24	 	 In	 addition,	 we	 experiment	 with	 dropping	 the	














level	 using	 all	 manufacturing	 firms	 in	 Denmark.	 The	 dependent	 variable	 is	 a	 firm	 j,	 year	 t	
characteristic	 (employment,	 output,	 average	 wage	 bill,	 etc.)	 and	 the	 explanatory	 variable	 is	 an	





















































H a v i n g 	e s t a b l i s h e d 	t h a t 	i m p o r t e d 	m a t e r i a l s 	a re 	l i k e l y 	t o 	su b s t i tute	 for	 labor	 within	 the	
firms,	 we	 now	 present	 the	 results	 of	 our	 main	 estimation.	 Our	 empirical	 strategy	 is	 to	 relate	
changes	in	individual	worker’s	wages	to	exogenous	changes	in	importing	and	exporting	activity	by	














in	 Table	 4,	 clustering	 the	 standard	 errors	 at	 the	 firm‐year	 level.	 In	 the	 offshoring	 regressions,	
changes	 in	 world	 export	 supply	 and	 transportation	 costs	 have	 the	 predicted	 sign	 and	 are	









estimates	 both	 with	 and	 without	 additional	 firm	 controls.	 In	 the	 fixed	 effect	 specifications	 we	














gains	 for	 skilled	 workers	 smaller ) 	w h e n 	w e 	c o n t r o l 	f o r 	t h e 	p r o d uctivity	 effect.	 Though	 these	



























(65%)	 of	 high	 skilled	 workers	 have	 positive	 predicted	 wage	 chang e s , 	a s 	b o t h 	o f f s h o r i n g 	a n d 	
exporting	tend	to	increase	high	skilled	wage.		The	distribution	has	a	median	of	0.29%	and	is	highly	
v a r i a b l e , 	w i t h 	a 	s t a n d a r d 	d e v i a t i o n 	o f 	w a g e 	c h a n g e s 	o f 	4 . 5 8 % . 		26%	 of	 skilled	 workers	 have	
predicted	wage	changes	above	1.5%	and	13%	have	wage	changes	below	–1.5%.				



















T h u s 	f a r 	w e 	h a v e 	e m p h a s i z e d 	n a r r o w	 offshoring	 (imports	 purchased	 in	 same	 industry	




pronounced	 difference	 between	 low	 and	 high	 skill	 wages.	 A	 possible	 explanation	 is	 that	 broad	
offshoring	 includes	 inputs	 of	 all	 types	 and	 is	 therefore	 more	 li k e l y 	t o 	c a p t u r e 	t h e 	e f f e c t 	o f 	
technological	change	operating	through	imports	of	machinery.		Further,	the	estimation	with	firm	
controls	 yields	 a	 much	 larger	 wage	 drop	 than	 the	 estimation	 without	 firm	 controls.	 This	 is	
consistent	with	the	view	that	the	productivity	effect,	as	distinct	from	the	labor	substitution	effect,	
can	be	seen	more	clearly	when	imported	inputs	are	different	from	those	made	by	the	firm.			
I t 	m a y 	s e e m 	p u z z l i n g 	t h a t 	a l t h o u g h 	m o s t 	o f 	D a n i s h 	t r a d e 	i s 	w i t h 	o t h e r 	h i g h 	i n c o m e 	
countries,	offshoring	tends	to	reduce	the	wage	of	low	skilled	workers.25		To	investigate	whether	our	
                                                 
25 In recent work Burstein and Vogel (2011) show that North-North trade can increase skill premium if productivity 
is complementary with skill, and their results also hold for North-North offshoring. To see this, consider the 
following simple extension of their framework. There are two countries with the same factor composition but 
differing in productivity for specific tasks.  A firm offshores a task if the foreign country is more productive in the 30 
 






















                                                                                                                                                             
task, which reduces the range of less productive tasks performed in the economy.  If productivity and skilled labor 
are complementary, this will raise the relative demand for high-skilled labor and the skill premium.  
26 We have also experimented with the following alternatives, and obtained similar results. (1) break low-skilled 
workers into medium-skilled and very low-skilled. They have similar wage elasticity estimates (see also note 8); (2) 
use the top 2 categories of pre-sample trade flows; (3) employ only the job spells longer than 5 years; and (4) define 
narrow offshoring as imports within the same HS2 categories as sales.  31 
 
augment	 equation	 (4)	 with	 the	 interaction	 between	 an	 occupational	 characteristic	 (OCC)	 and	
offshoring	 to	 see	 whether	 offshoring	 effects	 on	 wages	 are	 different	 across	 task	 characteristics	





































low	 skill	 workers	 suffer	 from	 offshoring	 we	 examined	 the	 interaction	 between	 offshoring	 and	










separate	 from	 the	 firm	 as	 part	 of	 a	 mass	 layoff	 event.	 We	 take	 this	 further	 by	 distinguishing	
whether	workers	were	displaced	immediately	after	their	former	employers	substantially	increased	
























                                                 
32	Our	definition	uses	gross	flows,	since	our	data	has	the	full	population	of	workers	and	firms.	The	literature	
(e.g.	 Jacobson	 et	 al.	 1993)	 typically	 defines	 mass‐layoff	 events	 using	 net	 flows.	 Net	 flows	 could	 miss	
displacement	events	if	a	firm	substantially	changes	the	composition	of	its	employment,	which,	as	shown	in	
Table	3,	happens	with	offshoring.	We	also	experimented	with	using	net	flows	and	obtained	similar	results.			
33	P r e d i c t e d 	o f f s h o r i n g 	i s 	m e a s u r e d 	a t 	t h e 	w o r k e r 	l e v e l , 	b u t 	p r e d icted	 offshoring	 is	 only	 observed	 for	
displaced	 workers	 in	 the	 predisplacement	 year.	 Therefore	 we	 measure	 predicted	 offshoring	 in	 the	
displacement	year	for	the	predisplacement	firm	as	an	average	over	all	remaining	workers	in	the	firm.	The	
change	in	predicted	offshoring	measured	this	way	is	valid,	if	the	within‐firm	dispersion	across	workers	in	












persistent	 wage	 losses	 of	 4	 percent.	 The	 top	 middle	 panel	 shows	 that	 for	 high‐skilled	 non‐
offshorers	 there	 are	 pronounced	 drops	 in	 annual	 labor	 earnings,	p e a k i n g 	i n 	t h e 	y e a r 	a f t e r 	









































u s e f u l 	c o m p a r i s o n 	w i t h 	e x i s t i n g 	s t u d i e s . 		J a c o b s o n 	e t 	a l . 	( 1 9 9 3 )	 used	 data	 on	 mass	 layoffs	 for	
workers	in	the	US,	and	found	losses	of	around	25	percent	of	pre‐displacement	earnings.	Studies	36 
 
based	 on	 European	 data	 have	 also	 found	 long‐term	 negative	 effect s 	o f 	d i s p l a c e m e n t 	b u t 	m o s t 	
studies	find	more	modest	effects.	For	example,	Albæk,	van	Audenrode	and	Browning	(2002)	find	





	 We	 employ	 a	 unique	 matched	 worker‐firm	 dataset	 from	 Denmark	 to	m e a s u r e 	h o w 	
offshoring	 shocks	 affect	 wages	 at	 the	 worker	 level.	 Our	 data	 rev e a l 	n e w 	s t y l i z e d 	f a c t s 	a b o u t 	
offshoring	 activities	 at	 the	 firm	 level.	 Because	 we	 observe	 the	 specific	 products	 and	 source	
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ftp://ftp.xwalkcenter.org/DOWNLOAD/xwalks/.	 For	 non‐routine	 tasks	 we	 use	 the	 principal	 component	 of	
mathematical	 reasoning	 (O*NET	 task	 id	 1.A.1.c.1),	 response	 orientation	 (1.A.2.b.3),	 gross	 body	 coordination	
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where	c	indexes	exporters,	k	indexes	HS6	products,	t	=	year,		f	=	transportation	charge,	v	=	value	of	shipment,	m	=	
indicator	for	transport	mode	(air,	ocean,	truck,	train),	and	w	=	weight	in	kg,	DIST	=	distance.	This	allows	shipping	costs	
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both	 hourly	 wage	 rate	 and	 hours	 worked,	 and	 annual	 gross	 earnings	 are	 the	 sum	 of	 annual	 labor	 earnings,	
unemployment	insurance	benefits	and	social	assistance.	The	vector	 i c consists	of	the	dummy	for	high‐skilled	worker,	
i S ,	an	offshorer	dummy	 i OFF ,	and	their	product.	 i  and	 t  	represent	worker	and	year	fixed	effects,	and	 it x is	a	
vector	of	time‐varying	worker	characteristics	(e.g.	union,	marriage	and	education	status)	as	controls.	Conditional	on	
the	control	variables	 i  ,	 t  ,	and	 it x 	equation	(A1)	estimates	the	profile	of	 it y for	the	nine	years	surrounding	the	
event	 of	 displacement:	 three	 pre‐displacement	 years	 (k	= ‐ 3 , ‐ 2 , ‐ 1 ) , 	t h e 	d i s p l a c e m e n t 	y e a r 	( k	= 	0 ) , 	a n d 	f i v e 	p o s t ‐
displacement	years	(k	=	1,…,5).	This	assumes	that	earnings	are	the	same	for	k	<	‐3	given	the	controls	 i  ,	 t  ,	and	 it x .		
The	dummy	variables,	
k
it D 	jointly	represent	the	event	of	displacement,	with	 k  	measuring	the	effect	of	displacement	For	Online	Publication	
 
 
on 	a 	w or ke rs 	e arn i n gs 	k	y e ars	fol l ow i n g	i t s	o ccu r re n ce . 	Eq u ati on	 (A1)	 imposes	 two	types	of	restrictions	on	the	




for	 it y in	order	to	distinguish	between	different	types	of	displaced	workers	as	captured	by	the	vector	 i c .	(i)	 it y 	
grows	or	declines	linearly	from	three	years	before	displacement	until	the	displacement	year.	(ii)	 it y 	is	constant	from	
the	displacement	year	to	three	years	after	displacement.	And	(iii)	 it y 	grows	or	declines	linearly	from	its	value	three	
years	after	displacement	until	the	end	of	the	sample	period.	The	restrictions	(i)‐(iii)	are	captured,	respectively,	by	the	
linear	variables	
123 ,, it it it FFF ,		where	
1 (4 ) , it Fts   if	worker	i	is	displaced	at	time	s	and	 3 st s ,	and	
1 0 it F 
otherwise,	
2 1, it F  	if	worker	i	is	displaced	at	time	s	and	 1 ts ,	and	
2 0 it F  otherwise,	and	
3 (2 ) , it Fts   if	
worker	i	is	displaced	at	time	s	and	 3 ts ,	and	
3 0 it F  otherwise.	
		The	baseline	values	for	 it y are	those	of	non‐displaced	workers	(given	controls i  ,	 t  ,	and	 it x ),	and	the	
estimates	of	 k  and	  	show	the	differences	in	earnings	of	displaced	workers	relative	to	the	base line	values.	In	
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In	words,	the	production	function	is	Cobb‐Douglas	in	capital	(whose	share	is	α)	and	composite	inputs	C f	
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   .	Taking	the	log	of	MPL1	and	using	equation	(A2)	we	obtain		
lnMPL1	=	
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If	 c01	= 	c 0f	 for	 all	 f	 =	 2,..,F,	 the	 coefficient	 for	 lnMjt	 in	 the	 expression	 for	 lnMPL1	 simplifies	 to	
10 1 0 1 2
11
11
[1 ] ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 )
F
f f cc  

        ,	 where	 the	 equality	 uses	
1 1
F
f f  






analogous.	Let	 , f S  >	0	be	the	labor	supply	elasticity	for	type‐f	labor.	Then	the	wage	elasticity	for	type‐f	labor,	net	of	
the	 productivity	 effect,	 is	
1
,1 0 ,
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HS6 Description Share Share
848340 GEARS;	BALL	OR	ROLLER	SCREWS;	GEAR	BOXES,	ETC 9.8% 9.8%
841391 PARTS	OF	PUMPS	FOR	LIQUIDS 8.8% 18.6%
848180 TAPS	COCKS	ETC	F	PIPE	VAT	INC	THERMO	CONTROL	NESOI 6.3% 24.8%
840999 SPARK‐IGNITION	RECIPROCATING	INT	COM	PISTN	ENG	PTS 5.3% 30.1%
848190 PTS	F	TAPS	ETC	F	PIPE	VAT	INC	PRESS	&	THERMO	CNTRL 4.3% 34.4%
841290 ENGINE	AND	MOTOR	PARTS,	NESOI 3.2% 37.6%
840810 MARINE	COMPRESS‐IGNIN	COMBUSTION	PISTON	ENGINE	ETC 2.2% 39.8%
841370 CENTRIFUGAL	PUMPS,	NESOI 2.2% 41.9%
841899 REFRIGERATOR	FREEZER	AND	HEAT	PUMP	PARTS	NESOI 1.8% 43.7%
848210 BALL	BEARINGS 1.8% 45.5%
848120 VALVES	F	OLEOHYDRAULIC	OR	PNEUMATIC	TRANSMISSIONS 1.5% 47.0%
843390 PARTS	FOR	HARVESTER,	GRASS	MOWERS,	SORTING	EGG	ETC 1.5% 48.5%
847990 PTS	OF	MACH/MECHNCL	APPL	W	INDVDUL	FUNCTION	NESOI 1.4% 49.9%
843890 PARTS	OF	MACH	OF	CH	84,	NESOI,IND	PREP	FOOD,DRINK 1.4% 51.3%
844900 MACH	F	MANUF	OR	FINISH	NONWOVENS;HAT	BLOCKS;	PARTS 1.4% 52.7%
843149 PARTS	AND	ATTACHMENTS	NESOI	FOR	DERRICKS	ETC. 1.3% 54.0%
847330 PARTS	&	ACCESSORIES	FOR	ADP	MACHINES	&	UNITS 1.2% 55.3%
847989 MACH	&	MECHANICAL	APPL	W	INDIVIDUAL	FUNCTION	NESOI 1.2% 56.5%
841430 COMPRESSORS	USED	IN	REFRIGERATING	EQUIPMENT 1.2% 57.6%
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Employment 9,820 4.94 0.89
Gross	Output 9,804 18.89 1.05
Capital	per	worker 9,759 12.39 0.98
Average	wage	bill	per	worker 9,772 12.54 0.22
Accounting	Profits 7,816 9.07 1.70
Skill	shares…
High‐skill 9,772 0.16 0.12
Low‐skill 9,772 0.84 0.12
Firm‐level	trade	data…
Log(broad	offshoring) 9,820 16.85 1.53
Broad	Offshoring/gross	output 9,804 0.19 0.16
Broad	Offshoring/material	purchases 9,756 0.43 0.29
Broad	Offshoring,	log	deviation	from	firm	mean 9,820 0.49 0.57
Log(narrow	offshoring) 9,249 16.00 2.26
Narrow	offshoring/gross	output 9,804 0.12 0.15
Narrow	offshoring/material	purchases 9,756 0.27 0.28
Narrow	offshoring,	log	deviation	from	firm	mean 9,249 0.82 0.94
Log(exports) 9,555 17.54 2.06
Exports/gross	output 9,804 0.45 0.32
Exports,	log	deviation	from	firm	mean 9,555 0.46 0.66
In	worker‐firm	data…
Hourly	wage 1,950,896 192.85 70.19
Log	hourly	wage 1,950,896 5.19 0.31
Log	gross	output 1,950,896 20.50 1.69
Log	employment 1,950,896 6.44 1.49
Log	capital	per	worker 1,950,896 12.59 0.89
High‐skill 1,950,896 0.19 0.14
Experience	 1,950,896 17.93 9.31
Union 1,950,896 0.88 0.33

























dummy	 log(offshoring) log(offshoring) log(offshoring) log(exports)
…in	logs…
employment 0.681 0.044 ‐0.103 ‐0.196 0.346
gross	output 0.958 0.082 0.393 0.151 0.486
accounting	profits 0.953 0.066 0.487 0.012 0.831
capital	per	worker 0.161 0.005 0.227 0.099 0.282
wage	bill	per	worker 0.040 0.014 0.217 0.127 0.119
material	inputs 1.162 0.083 0.216 ‐0.105 0.653
domestic	material	inputs 0.668 0.037 0.371 ‐0.048 0.777
…shares…
Share	of	high‐skilled	workers ‐0.007 0.002 0.087 0.048 0.066
Materials/output 0.093 0.005 ‐0.039 ‐0.050 0.032














Log	WES,	offshoring 0.2071** 0.3351*** ‐0.0396*** ‐0.0185*** 0.0046 0.0933 ‐0.0150*** 0.0005
[2.46] [4.01] [‐5.86] [‐3.18] [0.04] [0.80] [‐3.00] [0.11]
Log	exchange	rates,	offshoring ‐0.2802 ‐0.2644 ‐0.0382* ‐0.0280* 0.2136 0.2442 0.0046 0.0095
[‐0.91] [‐0.87] [‐1.81] [‐1.84] [0.88] [0.99] [0.30] [0.98]
Log	transport	costs,	offshoring ‐17.7718***‐21.5515*** 0.2429 ‐0.5668 1.8464 ‐1.4397 0.8585*** 0.2662
[‐2.94] [‐3.53] [0.50] [‐1.39] [0.69] [‐0.51] [2.71] [1.08]
Log	WID,	exports ‐0.0778 0.1080 ‐0.0490*** ‐0.0162** 0.2689*** 0.4054*** ‐0.0294*** ‐0.0061
[‐0.58] [0.83] [‐5.15] [‐2.05] [2.86] [4.25] [‐3.77] [‐1.02]
Log	exchange	rates,	exports ‐0.5336 ‐0.7235 ‐0.0328 ‐0.0711** 0.6753 0.5215 0.0460** 0.0134
[‐1.11] [‐1.51] [‐0.91] [‐2.46] [1.36] [1.03] [2.01] [0.72]
Log	transport	costs,	exports 22.4817***23.1068*** ‐2.2394*** ‐1.6001** ‐6.1858 ‐4.1498 ‐0.4224 0.1893
[2.98] [3.05] [‐3.22] [‐2.49] [‐0.94] [‐0.63] [‐1.08] [0.53]
Interactions	with	high	skill	dummy:
Log	WES,	offshoring ‐0.0528 ‐0.0851 0.3317*** 0.3232*** 0.0830 0.0521 0.2686*** 0.2633***
[‐0.68] [‐1.17] [4.19] [4.11] [1.06] [0.65] [5.17] [4.97]
Log	exchange	rates,	offshoring ‐0.6115*** ‐0.4617** ‐0.5600** ‐0.5304** ‐0.1040 0.0255 0.0998 0.1182
[‐3.09] [‐2.32] [‐2.15] [‐2.02] [‐0.65] [0.16] [0.72] [0.85]
Log	transport	costs,	offshoring 1.2829 ‐1.1068 ‐17.3882***‐18.1440*** 1.2450 ‐1.2536 0.4712 ‐0.1018
[0.28] [‐0.25] [‐3.01] [‐3.14] [0.40] [‐0.39] [0.13] [‐0.03]
Log	WID,	exports 0.0318 0.1236 0.3478*** 0.3658*** ‐0.2571*** ‐0.1834*** 0.3271*** 0.3390***
[0.31] [1.18] [4.27] [4.48] [‐4.18] [‐2.95] [6.38] [6.56]
Log	exchange	rates,	exports 0.6076 0.6535* 0.5114* 0.4946* ‐0.5439 ‐0.5630 ‐0.2087 ‐0.2264
[1.62] [1.71] [1.79] [1.67] [‐1.62] [‐1.63] [‐1.06] [‐1.13]
Log	transport	costs,	exports ‐3.2023 ‐4.4399 25.8055***25.5637*** ‐2.7719 ‐3.7232 ‐5.1812 ‐5.3792*
[‐0.71] [‐0.97] [4.29] [4.24] [‐0.69] [‐0.91] [‐1.63] [‐1.68]
Additional	Firm	Controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
F‐statistics	for	instruments 3.60 6.48 20.46 15.30 5.55 11.71 14.40 11.39
Observations 1,928,599 1,928,599 1,928,599 1,928,599 1,950,896 1,950,896 1,950,896 1,950,896
Number	of	firms 383,035 383,035 383,035 383,035 384,257 384,257 384,257 384,257
R‐squared 0.1021 0.0591 0.0655 0.0541 0.1240 0.0716 0.0636 0.0473
Notes:	
Excluded instruments only reported. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. T‐statistics in brackets. Standard errors clustered at firm‐year
levels.		Industry,	time,	regional	and	job	spell	fixed	effects	included	in	all	specifications










Log(offshoring) ‐0.0030** ‐0.0019 ‐0.0191** ‐0.0167**
[‐2.19] [‐1.43] [‐2.07] [‐2.07]
Log(offshoring)	x	high‐skilled 0.0065*** 0.0066*** 0.0505*** 0.0538***
[4.82] [4.88] [7.19] [7.68]
Log(exports) 0.0051* 0.0066** 0.0369*** 0.0444***
[1.78] [2.36] [3.98] [6.65]
Log(exports)	x	high‐skilled ‐0.0006 0.0002 0.0063 0.0060









Industry	price	index ‐0.0001 ‐0.0004 0.0002 0.0000
[‐0.64] [‐1.62] [0.99] [0.13]
Experience 0.0169*** 0.0179*** 0.0162*** 0.0164***
[13.07] [13.85] [12.28] [11.78]
Experience2 ‐0.0005*** ‐0.0005*** ‐0.0005*** ‐0.0005***
[‐84.04] [‐84.74] [‐77.01] [‐73.92]
Union 0.0137*** 0.0136*** 0.0147*** 0.0144***
[12.62] [12.64] [14.01] [14.06]
Married 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0031*** 0.0030***
[6.55] [6.67] [5.79] [5.68]
Other	firm‐level	controls Yes No Yes No
Obs 1,928,599 1,928,599 1,928,599 1,928,599
No.	job	spells 383,035 383,035 383,035 383,035
R2 0.1514 0.1496 0.1517 0.1500
Notes:	










Min ‐30% 0% 30%
‐30% 0% 30% Max
Min ‐30% 3.1 6.7 5.6 2.2
‐0.90 0.50 1.58 5.28
‐30% 0% 1.9 13.7 9.7 1.4
‐1.82 ‐0.17 0.58 2.41
0% 30% 1.6 9.8 15.2 2.8
‐2.42 ‐0.61 0.23 1.80
30% Max 1.5 5.3 13.3 6.3
‐4.91 ‐1.51 ‐0.49 1.40
Panel	B:	High‐skilled	workers
Min ‐30% 3.2 6.3 4.5 1.4
‐7.51 ‐2.71 ‐1.29 ‐0.12
‐30% 0% 1.6 15.1 10.9 1.4
‐3.09 ‐0.71 0.09 1.63
0% 30% 1.8 11.3 16.4 2.8
‐1.80 0.07 1.02 2.80
30% Max 1.3 5.0 12.4 4.6


















Log(offshoring) ‐0.0138** ‐0.0153*** ‐0.0230** ‐0.0174* ‐0.0549* ‐0.0355 ‐0.0152** ‐0.0143** ‐0.0371*** ‐0.0287***
[‐2.39] [‐2.96] [‐2.00] [‐1.69] [‐1.88] [‐1.32] [‐2.07] [‐2.11] [‐3.27] [‐2.88]
Log(offshoring)	x	high‐skilled 0.0543*** 0.0587*** 0.0559*** 0.0566*** 0.1277*** 0.1280*** 0.0292*** 0.0290*** 0.0727*** 0.0855***
[7.50] [7.81] [7.06] [7.47] [7.40] [8.17] [4.29] [4.32] [8.45] [9.81]
Log(exports) 0.0447*** 0.0496*** 0.0345*** 0.0393*** 0.0534*** 0.0570*** 0.0269*** 0.0348*** 0.0339** 0.0627***
[4.93] [6.87] [4.51] [5.54] [4.37] [3.89] [2.73] [5.05] [2.21] [6.90]
Log(exports)	x	high‐skilled 0.0014 ‐0.0018 ‐0.0011 0.0029 ‐0.0565*** ‐0.0521*** 0.0363*** 0.0416*** ‐0.0219 ‐0.0295**
[0.12] [‐0.15] [‐0.09] [0.26] [‐3.04] [‐3.48] [3.45] [4.32] [‐1.58] [‐2.24]
Other	firm‐level	controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Obs 967,053 967,053 1,925,909 1,925,909 1,950,896 1,950,896 1,917,625 1,917,625 1,692,736 1,692,736
No.	job	spells 103,989 103,989 382,142 382,142 384,257 384,257 380,781 380,781 338,922 338,922
R2 0.1815 0.1788 0.1518 0.1500 0.1509 0.1492 0.1515 0.1498 0.1529 0.1512
First	stage	IV	F‐statistics:
log	offshoring 5.2 10.5 3.4 5.5 4.3 10.4 4.9 8.4 4.6 6.4
...	x	high	skill 19.9 16.2 20.0 15.0 23.5 22.4 18.3 12.1 17.9 13.1
log	exports 6.0 14.1 5.0 10.2 5.7 10.9 5.4 11.1 3.9 8.4




















Log(offshoring) ‐0.0023 0.0028 ‐0.0057 0.0067 ‐0.0081 0.0053 ‐0.0120 ‐0.0061
[‐0.26] [0.34] [‐0.71] [0.91] [‐1.01] [0.73] [‐1.37] [‐0.74]
Log(offshoring)	x	high‐skilled ‐0.0081 ‐0.0077 ‐0.0300*** ‐0.0242*** ‐0.0249*** ‐0.0189*** 0.0216*** 0.0250***
[‐1.18] [‐1.09] [‐4.51] [‐3.49] [‐3.77] [‐2.70] [3.21] [3.63]
Log(offshoring)	x	OCC ‐0.0393*** ‐0.0410*** 0.0494*** 0.0477*** ‐0.0432*** ‐0.0413*** 0.0282*** 0.0271***
[‐14.17] [‐15.24] [11.40] [11.18] [‐10.63] [‐10.29] [9.78] [9.65]
Log(exports) 0.0349*** 0.0434*** 0.0072 0.0281*** 0.0028 0.0250*** 0.0283*** 0.0398***
[3.71] [6.11] [0.82] [4.07] [0.32] [3.66] [3.22] [5.65]
Log(exports)	x	high‐skilled 0.0062 0.0053 0.0167 0.0212* 0.0242** 0.0284*** 0.0064 0.0090
[0.53] [0.45] [1.46] [1.91] [2.21] [2.65] [0.53] [0.77]
Other	firm‐level	controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Obs 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088
No.	job	spells 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590
R2 0.138 0.136 0.139 0.137 0.138 0.136 0.137 0.135
Occupational	characteristics	(OCC):
Log(offshoring) ‐0.0109 ‐0.0057 ‐0.0141 ‐0.0112 ‐0.0078 ‐0.0072 ‐0.0038 0.0042
[‐1.24] [‐0.69] [‐1.55] [‐1.32] [‐0.81] [‐0.84] [‐0.45] [0.54]
Log(offshoring)	x	high‐skilled 0.0131** 0.0160** 0.0471*** 0.0495*** 0.0251*** 0.0261*** ‐0.0100 ‐0.0075
[2.02] [2.42] [6.32] [6.58] [3.20] [3.37] [‐1.62] [‐1.18]
Log(offshoring)	x	OCC 0.0363*** 0.0365*** ‐0.0048** ‐0.0057*** ‐0.0222*** ‐0.0234*** 0.0435*** 0.0439***
[14.53] [14.57] [‐2.54] [‐3.03] [‐7.51] [‐8.50] [14.58] [14.83]
Log(exports) 0.0358*** 0.0457*** 0.0340*** 0.0405*** 0.0415*** 0.0443*** 0.0233*** 0.0364***
[3.92] [6.36] [3.84] [5.81] [4.47] [6.35] [2.61] [5.23]
Log(exports)	x	high‐skilled 0.0077 0.0081 0.0142 0.0145 0.0106 0.0086 0.0111 0.0126
[0.67] [0.73] [1.22] [1.30] [0.91] [0.76] [0.97] [1.14]
Other	firm‐level	controls Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Obs 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088 1,570,088
No.	job	spells 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590 376,590
R2 0.138 0.136 0.136 0.135 0.137 0.135 0.138 0.137
Note:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. T‐statistics in brackets. Standard errors clusteredat firm‐yearlevels. Industry, time, regional and
job	spell	fixed	effects	included	in	all	specifications.	Coefficient	estimates	of	the	other	variables	not	reported	to	save	space.	
Non‐Routine							
(Math)
Social	Sciences Harzardous Communication
Routine Non‐Routine
Natural	Sciences
Non‐Routine						
(Other	than	Math)